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Consular Notification in Death Penalty Cases Returns to the World Court:
A Note on Avena and Medellín
by Juan J. Quintana*

Consular Notification and the Avena Case:
Background

Courtesy of Grace Maral Burnett

I

n the aftermath of World War II, the United States played
a crucial role in establishing the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) as the principal judicial organ of the United
Nations and was a true champion of international justice. In
subsequent years, however, U.S. conduct concerning the ICJ’s
decisions that directly affect its interests has been far from
exemplary. The most recent instance was the refusal of the U.S.
Supreme Court to domestically enforce the ICJ’s 2004 judgment
in the Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United
States)1 case. The present note seeks to highlight recent international developments with regard to this case and to analyze the
manner in which the ICJ dealt with the June 5, 2008 Mexican
request for interpretation of the Avena judgment. The June 2008
request gave rise to fresh proceedings that are commonly known
as the Medellín case.2

The International Court of Justice, The Hague.

In Avena, the ICJ analyzed the situation of a group of Mexican
citizens tried and sentenced to death in several U.S. states without access to the assistance of the competent Mexican consuls,
as provided in Article 36 of the 1963 Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations (VCCR).3 The Mexican government’s claim
was not directed at the penalty imposed on those individuals, but
rather at the fact that U.S. authorities failed to inform them of
their right to consular assistance when they were detained and
prosecuted. Mexico’s counsel argued that this information could
have made a difference in the manner in which the trials were
conducted before state courts. The ICJ, thus, had to resolve the
issue of whether the U.S. government breached VCCR’s Article
36, and if so, whether it was bound to provide a remedy to the
Mexican government.
In a March 31, 2004 judgment, the ICJ found that the United
States had effectively breached its obligations owed to the
Mexican government under Article 36. The Court further held
that:

In this decision, the ICJ generally followed the LaGrand case
(Germany v. United States), decided in 2001, where essentially
the same questions were at issue.5 In particular, the Court reaffirmed its landmark ruling in LaGrand, holding that Article 36
creates individual rights that the detained person’s country can
invoke in the ICJ under the jurisdictional clause contained in the
Optional Protocol to the Convention.6

The Medellín Case: Mexico returns to the ICJ
While in principle, the Avena case came to an end with the
delivery of the 2004 judgment, the Mexican government filed
a new application before the ICJ on June 5, 2008, prompted by
the failure of U.S. courts to implement that decision. At this
stage, the primary issue between Mexico and the United States
was the practical execution of the March 31, 2004 judgment, a
matter governed by Article 94 (2) of the United Nations Charter.
Pursuant to this provision, a state party to a case is free to resort
to the UN Security Council if the other party “[f]ails to perform
the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by
the Court.” This is the road that the Mexican government may
have taken, like Nicaragua did in 1986 in the aftermath of the
celebrated decision by the ICJ in the Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua case. A fundamental lesson from Nicaragua, however — one from which the Mexican
government likely learned — is that the existence of the veto
power may render this remedy largely ineffective when the
defaulting party is a permanent member of the Security Council.
With this in mind, it is understandable that the Mexican government decided to avoid taking the route of the Security Council
and preferred to appeal once again to the ICJ. Mexico framed

[t]he appropriate reparation in this case consists in the
obligation of the United States of America to provide,
by means of its own choosing, review and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences of the Mexican
nationals . . . by taking account both of the violation of
the rights set forth in Article 36 of the Convention and
of paragraphs 138 to 141 of this Judgment.4
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its case as a request for interpretation of the 2004 judgment, a
matter on which the ICJ possesses jurisdiction under Article 60
of its Statute.
On the other hand, these cases are highly illustrative of the
interplay between international law and domestic law, which
is particularly interesting in the case of federal states. Indeed,
Avena and Medellín underscore some of the complex questions
of compliance with rules of international law faced by a country like the United States, where state criminal law matters are
handled in state courts and only reach federal courts in exceptional circumstances. In this context, a remarkable aspect of
these cases is that, after the delivery of the ICJ’s 2004 decision

Facing this situation and having Texas authorities set the
date for the execution of José Ernesto Medellín and four other
Mexican nationals covered by the Avena decision, the Mexican
government applied anew to the ICJ. In addition to its request
for interpretation of the Avena decision, the Mexican government filed an urgent request for provisional measures under
Article 41 of the ICJ Statute. While requests for this type of
interim relief are a frequent feature of litigation before the ICJ,
this is the first time in ICJ history that provisional measures
have been requested in a case that has formally ended and in
which the construction of one of the ICJ’s judgments is being
requested.

The Court’s response (I):
The request for interpretation

Indeed, Avena and
Medellín underscore some
of the complex questions
of compliance with rules of
international law faced by
a country like the United
States, where state criminal
law matters are handled
in state courts and only
reach federal courts in
exceptional circumstances.

The ICJ replied swiftly to the Mexican government’s request,
undoubtedly because the lives of several individuals on death
row, whose executions were imminent, were at stake. After oral
proceedings organized in a matter of weeks, on July 16, 2008,
the ICJ issued an order which imposed on the United States the
duty to “take all measures necessary” to ensure that the five
Mexican nationals covered by the request for interpretation,
including Medellín, were not executed pending judgment.9
The U.S. government contended that the request for interpretation should be dismissed in limine due to a “manifest lack
of jurisdiction” because there was no “dispute as to the meaning
or scope of the judgment,” as stipulated in Article 60 of the ICJ
Statute, between the United States and Mexico. According to
the U.S. government, the real problem pertained to the implementation of the judgment in Avena and not to the judgment’s
construction. Moreover, counsel for the United States argued
that the problem was rooted in the U.S. courts’ adoption of the
position that the ICJ’s decisions are not directly enforceable as
a matter of federal law.
From a procedural point of view, this preliminary question
did not actually refer to the jurisdiction of the ICJ to interpret
its own decisions, but rather, to the admissibility of the Mexican
government’s request for interpretation. The ICJ’s jurisdiction
in the matter of interpretation has a solid basis in Article 60
of the ICJ’s Statute and, as the ICJ pointed out in its July 16,
2008 order, “[it] is not preconditioned by the existence of any
other basis of jurisdiction as between the parties to the original
case.”10
As to the question of admissibility, the ICJ made a finding
in favor of Mexico. The ICJ analyzed Article 60 of its Statute
and discovered the existence of a discrepancy between the
English and French versions of that provision. Specifically, the
term “dispute” used in the English version is rendered in the
French version as “contestation” rather than “différend.” This
distinction is significant because “différend ” is the term used in
other provisions of the Statute where reference is made to legal
disputes, such as the well-known provisions of Article 36(2) or
Article 38. The Court found that “[t]he term ‘contestation’ is
wider in scope than the term ‘différend ’ and does not require
the same degree of opposition”; that “[c]ompared to the term
‘différend,’ the concept underlying the term ‘contestation’ is
more flexible in its application to a particular situation”; and
that “[a] dispute (‘contestation’ in the French text) under Article
60 of the Statute, understood as a difference of opinion between
the parties as to the meaning and scope of a judgment rendered

in Avena, the executive branch made a deliberate and unprecedented attempt to give domestic legal effect to a decision by the
ICJ, only to have that action later reversed by the judiciary.
On February 28, 2005, President George W. Bush issued a
memorandum to the Attorney General in which he stated that
the United States would discharge its international obligations
under the ICJ’s decision in Avena “[b]y having State courts give
effect to the decision in accordance with general principles of
comity in cases filed by the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in
that decision.”7 The U.S. Supreme Court determined on March
25, 2008, however, that the memorandum did not create legal
rules whose enforcement could be imposed on Texas courts.
The Supreme Court further held that the decisions of the ICJ do
not constitute federal law and are, therefore, not enforceable by
federal courts against a state.8 To be fair, the Supreme Court duly
acknowledged that in the field of international law, the United
States is bound by the decisions of the ICJ in cases to which it
is a party. It also stressed, however, that the execution of those
decisions as a matter of federal law requires a statute enacted by
Congress and not executive action by the administration.
30
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The question of the legal effects of

by the Court…does not need to satisfy the same criteria as
would a dispute (‘différend ’ in the French text) as referred to
in Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute.”11 On the basis of
these general propositions, advanced for the first time in this
order, the Court concluded that there was indeed a “difference
of opinion” between the parties on the scope and meaning of the
2004 judgment and that, therefore, the request for interpretation
was admissible.
It must be stressed, however, that the ICJ decided in favor
of the admissibility of the request for interpretation by a tight
majority (7 votes against 5). This demonstrates that several
members of the Court share the opinion that this case does not
refer to the interpretation of the 2004 judgment at all but rather to
its implementation — a matter on which neither the UN Charter
nor the ICJ Statute highlights any role for the Court itself.

orders on provisional measures

An altogether different matter is that of compliance with
the provisional measures indicated by the Court. The Breard
case (Paraguay v. United States) submitted in 1998 and later
discontinued, and the LaGrand case, both concerned persons
sentenced to death whose right to timely consular assistance had
not been respected by U.S. authorities. In both, the ICJ indicated
provisional measures which the United States openly ignored,
resulting in the executions being carried out as planned.17 It is
important to note, however, that at the time these cases were
decided, the ICJ’s law and practice was not entirely clear as to
the legal effects of the orders on provisional measures. After
all, provisional measures orders are not ICJ judgments and are,
therefore, not expressly covered by the force of res judicata
provided for in Article 94 of the United Nations Charter.
The Court erased all doubt about the legal effect of provisional measures with the LaGrand case. When this case reached
the merits stage, Germany included in its final submissions a
request that the ICJ declare that the United States violated not
only the VCCR, but also its international obligation to comply
with the ICJ’s previous order on provisional measures. In its
judgment of June 27, 2001, the ICJ found in favor of Germany
on this aspect of the case and, in doing so, put to rest the longstanding doctrinal controversy about the legal effect of provisional measures.18 As a result, today there can be no doubt that
under international law orders by the ICJ indicating provisional
measures are legally binding and, consequently, lack of compliance by one of the states to which they are addressed is in violation of that state’s international responsibility.

The Court’s response (II):
Interim Protection
As for the request for provisional measures, the case is of
particular interest to those who follow the work and procedure
of the ICJ because of the manner in which the Court approached
the question of jurisdiction. In general, before the Court examines the conditions required for the exercise of its powers under
Article 41 of its Statute, it considers whether it has “prima facie
jurisdiction” with regard to the merits of the case in whose
context the request for interim protection is made. This is a
jurisdictional test that has no statutory basis but has been developed exclusively on the basis of the ICJ’s jurisprudence since
the mid-seventies. It is now firmly established that “[i]n dealing with a request for provisional measures the Court need not
[have] jurisdiction on the merits of the case, but [the Court] will
not indicate such measures unless there is prima facie basis on
which the jurisdiction of the Court might be established.”12
In the case at hand, because the request for interim relief
related to the requested interpretation of the 2004 judgment
rather than the merits of the case, the ICJ flatly ignored the prima
facie test of jurisdiction. It concentrated instead on ascertaining
whether the conditions for the admissibility of the request for
interpretation were fulfilled, a question that is technically and
conceptually different from that of jurisdiction.
After determining that the threshold of admissibility in
Article 60 of the Statute was met, the ICJ inquired whether the
remaining conditions necessary for the indication of provisional
measures were satisfied in the case at hand. Put simply, these are
the criteria developed through the Court’s jurisprudence:
(a) Whether a link exists “[b]etween the alleged rights the
protection of which is the subject of the provisional
measures being sought, and the subject of the principal
request submitted to the Court.”13
(b) Whether there is a risk of an “[i]rreparable prejudice to
be caused to rights which are the subject of a dispute in
judicial proceedings”;14 and
(c) Whether there is “[u]rgency in the sense that action prejudicial to the rights of either party is likely to be taken
before the Court has given its final decision.”15
The majority of the ICJ concluded that the request submitted
by the Mexican government fulfilled these criteria. Therefore,
the ICJ found that “the circumstances require that it indicate
provisional measures to preserve the rights of the Mexican government, as Article 41 of its Statute provides.”16

Prospects
On August 5, 2008 Texas authorities executed Medellín, the
first of the Mexican nationals covered by the ICJ’s July 16, 2008
order on provisional measures. In light of this development, it
is foreseeable that, in connection with its pending request for
interpretation of the 2004 judgment, the Mexican government
will request a formal finding on lack of compliance with its
order and some form of remedy from the ICJ. It remains to be
seen how the ICJ will approach this issue in its judgment on the
interpretation of the Avena decision, which very likely will be
delivered before the end of 2008.19
From the standpoint of international law, the ICJ has found
that its orders on provisional measures have binding effect and
create international legal obligations with which the parties to a
case before it are required to comply. There is thus no escape
from the conclusion that Medellín’s execution represents an
internationally wrongful act on the part of the United States,
giving rise to its international responsibility vis-à-vis the state
of Mexico.
It is certainly regrettable that U.S. authorities have not found
a way to ensure compliance with the ICJ’s orders on provisional
measures as a matter of federal law. Furthermore, as this situation might recur in connection with any future case involving
the United States that is brought before the ICJ, the U.S. government should push for Congress to pass implementing legislation
to give domestic effect to ICJ decisions, including orders for
provisional measures.
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example.20 In stark contrast, the next time the United States
appears before the ICJ, either as an applicant or as a respondent,
its attitude with regard to the Avena and Medellín cases will
certainly loom large. If for instance, the United States finds it
expedient to request from the Court the indication of provisional
measures of protection, the opposite party will have a powerful
argument to undermine the United States’ standing before the
Court and to question the authenticity of its commitment to the
rule of law in international affairs.		
HRB

In the long run, one could argue that lack of compliance
with the ICJ Statute is harmful for the United States itself, for it
seriously weakens its commitment to the judicial settlement of
disputes and, more generally, to the principles enshrined in the
UN Charter. When the United States has appeared before the
ICJ in the past it has made full use of the Court’s procedures —
including provisional measures — to vigorously demand from
other States compliance with the rules of international law. The
1979–1981 U.S. Hostages in Tehran case provides a powerful
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